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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN G. HENDRIE COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH; 
LAURETTA M. GLADDEN, Case No. 9368 
widow; and LOUISE GLAD-
DEN, for and on behalf of 
DARLENE LOUISE GLAD-
DEN, minor child of CLAR-
ENCE ROLAND GLADDEN, 
deceased. 
Defendants and Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents add the following Statement of 
Facts: 
The decedent, Clarence Roland Gladden, was 
killed February 16, 1959 (R. 1). At the time of 
his death the decedent was employed by the John 
G. Hendrie Company (R. 1). The employer, John 
G. Hendrie Company, ~at the time of the deceased's 
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death, was building a swimming pool for the City 
of Clearfield (R. 1). However, the employer had 
not complied with the provisions of the Workman's 
Compensation Law of the State of Utah with refer-
ence to obtaining insurance coverage to protect its 
employees (R. 6-7). Application was filed by Laur-
etta M. Gladden, wife of the deceased, and Louise 
Gladden, for and on behalf of Darlene Louise Glad-
den, minor daughter of the deceased. Since the em-
ployer, John G. Hendrie Co., had not complied with 
the law of the State of Utah with reference to secur-
ing insurance coverage for his employees, applica-
tion was made before the Industrial Comn1ission 
of the State of Colorado, where the John G. Hendrie 
Co. had obtained insurance coverage. That pursuant 
to the order of the Industrial Commission of Color-
ado, Colorado disclaimed any jurisdiction on the 
basis that the con tract of hire was entered in to in 
the State of Utah·; that the fatal injury occurred 
in the State of Utah, and that the decedent was a 
resident of the State of Wyoming at the time of 
his death (R. 4). 
Hearing was held before the Industrial Com-
mission on December 14, 1959. Appellant, John G. 
Hendrie Co., has limited its appeal to the question 
of whether or not the deceased died from an acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment. 
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It was stipulated at the hearing by the attorney 
for the plaintiff and appellant (R. 18): 
"We will stipulate that he (deceased) was 
employed at the time of his death. We will 
further stipulate that he died as a result of 
an accident as stated in the petition but it is 
denied that the accident arose out of or was 
in the course of his employment." 
In other \Vords, that he was an employee on 
the job at the time of his death (R. 18). 
Mr. S. W. Smith testified that on the 16th of 
February, 195'9, he was employed by John G. Hen-
drie Co. ( R. 19) ; that he was the superin ten dent 
of construction on the particular job in question, 
and that as a part of his job he had the supervision 
of the employee, the deceased man, Clarence R. 
Gladden (R. 20). Mr. Smith testified (R. 20): 
"Q. He was working in this ditch? 
"A. Not at the time, no. As a rna tter of 
fact he had no specific job to do at that time, 
because I planned on using him for various 
incidental jobs around there during the after-
noon. And at this time, with no definite thing 
to do, why he was the type that always found 
something to do anyhow, and I'm sure -
rather I'm not sure what he was doing at that 
tin1e. I can't be sure what he was doing. There 
was 35 or 45 minutes maybe that he had no 
specific job to do, but there specifically was 
no specific job to do in the ditch." 
At R. 21 Mr. Smith was asked whether or not 
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he remembered being in the home of a Mr. and Mrs. 
Fred Little on the 16th of February, 1959, and at 
that time whether he recalled a statement he made 
to Mrs. Gladden and to Mr. and Mrs. Fred Little 
to the effect "that you should not have sent him 
down into the trench." Mr. Smith denied such state-
rnent. Mr. Smith testified that he did not know how 
the deceased got into the trench in which he was 
killed (R. 21-2'2). Mr. Smith testified that he had 
definitely told the decedent not to go back into the 
trench, however, that he had been in the trench prior 
to the accident. That on the prior occasion when he 
was in the trench it was only three and a half feet 
deep; that at the time the trench caved in when 
Mr. Smith was asked how deep it was, he stated 
that it was four feet deep (R. 23). On cross-exam-
ination Mr. Smith testified (R. 24-25): 
fied: 
"Q. Mr. Smith, do you specifically tell 
each one of the workers what to do? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. So if I were working for you, and 
you told me to do one job and it took me a half-
hour, would I then sit down and wait for you 
to come and tell me what else to do? 
"A. Not normally. Normally I'd find 
out that you had done your prescribed work, 
and I'd put you on something else." 
At R. 32 of the record Mr. Smith further testi-
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"Q. Was there any other person on that 
job at that time, in charge and authorized to 
give him orders? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you see him go back down into 
the ditch? 
"A. No, I didn't." 
Mr. Smith testified further there were approxi-
mately eleven or twelve people in the area and on 
the job somewhere near where Mr. Gladden was 
killed and apparently none of them saw how Mr. 
Gladden got into the trench- whether he fell, slid 
in, or got in of his own volition ( R. 33). 
Mrs. Lauretta Gladden testified that after the 
accident her son had taken her to the home of Mr. 
and Mrs. Little and that while she was there Mr. 
S. W. Smith, the foreman, came to the home. That 
there in the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Little, Mrs. 
Gladden's son and his wife, and she thought prob-
ably there may have been some police officers pre-
sent, Mr. Smith stated (R. 38-39) : 
"Q. Will you tell us what that conver-
sation was? 
A. Well, as far as I can remember he 
came in to tell me how sorry he v1as, and ex-
plain what had happened. And then he said 
it was the first time that his company had 
ever had an accident, and that - the way I 
remember it - he said he shouldn't have sent 
Mr. Glad den down in the ditch, to clean out a 
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valve, or something was mentioned in it. I 
can't remember the exact words. And he said 
a settlement would be made within a month, 
or something like that. 
"Q. But he definitely stated that he 
should not have sent Mr. Gladden down into 
the trench? 
A. That's the way I understood it to 
be. And some valve or something was men-
tioned. But I don't know anything about any-
thing like that.'' 
On the 2nd of May, 1'960, further hearing was 
held in the above matter. At that hearing Ellen 
Irene Pel ton was called as a witness and at R. 89 
and 90 of the record she testified as follows: 
"Q. Calling your attention to the 16th 
day of February, 1959, did you have occasion 
to be in the home of your mother, Mrs. Little? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. Somewheres in the evening, or to-
wards evening? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. And on that occasion did an indi-
vidual by the name of Bill Smith come into 
your home? 
"A. He did. 
"Q. Will you tell us who was present at 
that time, as best you can remember? 
A. There was my father, my mother, 
myself, my husband, my younger brothers 
and Mrs. Gladden. 
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"Q. I see. Do you remember, and would 
you tell us, what conversation you had with 
this Bill Smith? In other words what Bill 
Smith said and what you said. 
A. Oh, he said that he was very sorry 
about the death, and that he shoudn't have 
sent Mr. Gladden down into the ditch to un-
plug the pipes, because the ditch had caved 
in three times prior to that." 
Further, at said hearing a Mrs. Marvis Mc-
Quillan Little testified ( R. 92) : 
"Q. Calling your attention to the 16th 
of February, 1959 -the evening of the death 
of Mr. Clarence R. Gladden- do you recall 
being in your home that evening, and having 
a conversation with a Mr. Bill Smith? 
A. Yes. 
"Q. And would you tell us who was pre-
sent at that time? 
A. Mrs. Gladden, Loren Pelton, Ellen 
Pelton, Laurence Pelton, John Little, Ted 
Little, Fred Little and myself. 
"Q. And will you tell us the conversa-
tion that was had at that time with Mr. Bill 
Smith? 
A. He said he was very sorry. He 
shouldn't have sent Mr. Gladden into the 
trench. It had caved before, and he shouldn't 
have done it." 
On the 19th of July, 1'960, decision was ren-
dered by the Commission which in part reads as 
follows (R. 107-108): 
"If we believe the testimony of witnesses 
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for applicants, we must find that deceased did 
not depart from his employment. 
"We call attention to the fact that no one 
saw deceased enter the ditch, but he was found 
in the ditch covered almost completely by froz-
en earth. He either entered the ditch in viola-
tion of the order of Mr. Smith, fell into the 
ditch when the side caved or, if we believe 
applicant's witnesses, he entered the ditch pur-
suant to Mr. Smith's order. 
''We can legally presume that a servant 
obeys the orders of his master. We can legally 
presume that any individual will take neces-
sary precautions to protect his own life. 
"Nothing in the record explains why Mr. 
Gladden should have entered the ditch in vi-
olation of the order of Mr. Smith. The pre-
sumption is that Mr. Gladden would not have 
entered the dangerous ditch unless ordered 
to do so by Mr. Smith. 
"The Commission chooses to believe the 
testimony of the three witnesses for applicant. 
'Therefore, we find that deceased did not dis-
obey the order of the superintendent, Mr. 
Smith, and that he did -not depart from his 
employment. Therefore, we further find that 
the accident arose out of the employment of 
deceased.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVI-
DENCE UPON WHICH THE COMMISSION COULD 
FIND THAT THE DEATH OF THE EMPLOYEE RE-
SULTED FROM AN ACCIDENT WHICH AROSE OUT 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF DECEASED. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVI-
DENCE UPON WHICH THE COMMISSION COULD 
FIND THAT THE DEATH OF THE EMPLOYEE RE-
SULTED FROM AN ACCIDENT WHICH AROSE OUT 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF DECEASED. 
Findings of the Industrial Commission must be 
upheld if there is substantial evidence to sustain 
them. 
See Utah Idaho Sugar Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 71 Utah 190,263 P. 746: 
"Unless, therefore it can be said upon 
the whole record that the commission clearly 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making its 
finding and decision, this court is power less to 
interfere * * *"See Kanalinakis v. Ind. Com., 
67 Utah 17 4, 246 P 698; also Lorange v. Ind. 
Com., 107 Utah 261, 153 P 2d 272; Gogos v. 
Ind. Com., 87 Utah 101, 48 P 2d 449; Stod-
dard v. Ind. Com., 103 Utah 351, 135 P 2d 
256; Higley v. Industrial Commission et al, 
75 u. 361, 285 p 306. 
"Workmen's Compensation Act should be 
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes 
and where there is doubt it should be resolved 
in favor of coverage of an employee." See 
M & K Corp. v. Ind. Com., 112 Utah 488, 189 
P 2d 132; Jones v. Calif Pack. Corp., 121 Utah 
612, 242 p 2d 640. 
Appellant argues that there is no competent 
testimony upon which the Commission could base 
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its findings, and states that the testimony of appli-
cant, Lauretta Gladden, Ellen Irene Pelton and Mrs. 
Marvis McQuillan Little in relating their conversa-
tion with appellant's construction superintendent, 
S. A. Smith, is solely hearsay and cannot be used 
as a basis for the Commission's findings. 
It should be remembered that S. W. Smith was 
appellant's superintendent on the job and actually 
supervising the deceased employee and the appel-
lant's job at the time of the accident in question. 
Respondents contend that their testimony was 
competent and substantial. 
See Wigmore on Evidence, '3rd Ed. Par. 1078: 
" ( 1) He who sets another person to do 
an act in his stead as agent is chargeable in 
substantive law by such acts are done under 
that authority; so too, properly enough, ~ad­
missions made by the agent in the course of 
exercising that authority have the same testi-
monial value to discredit the party's present 
claim as if stated by the party himself. 
"The question therefore turns upon the 
scope of the authority. This question, frequent-
ly enough a difficult one, depends upon the 
doctrine of agency applied to the circum-
stances of the case, and not upon any rule of 
evidence. 
"The most difficult field in the applica-
tion of this principle is that of tortious li-
ability. For example, if A is an agent to drive 
a locomotive and a collision ensues, why may 
not his admissions, after the collision, ac-
10 
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knowledging his carelessness, be received 
against the employer? Are his statements un-
der such circumstances not made in perform-
ance of work he was set to do? If he had be-
fore the collision been asked by a brakeman 
whether the train would take a switch at a 
certain point, and had mentioned receiving 
certain instructions from the train dispatcher, 
this statement might be regarded as made in 
the course of his appointed work. N everthe-
less, such problems naturally admit of much 
speculation and barren argument. 
"In that class of cases, namely, cases in-
volving tortious liability, and, in particular, 
liability for injury in a railway accident, the 
question is usually complicated by the applic-
ability of the Hearsay exception for Spon-
taneous Declaration, which admits statements 
made under the influence of excitement, be-
fore declarant had "time to contrive or in-
vent." This serves commonly to admit the im-
mediate statements of the insured persons 
and the bystanders and since the much abused 
phrase 'res gestae' has been commonly em-
ployed to suggest the limitations of that Hear-
say exception, and has also been employed 
(though having nothing in common) to desig-
nate the scope of an agent's authority it is 
natural that judges should sometimes have 
discussed the two principles, in their applica-
tion to personal injuries as if there were but 
one principle. That there are two distinct and 
unrelated principles involved must be appar-
ent; and the sooner the courts insist on keep-
ing them apart, the better for the intelligent 
development of the law of Evidence. Practic-
ally, the results of the two principles in appli-
cation are decidedly different; for upon the 
11 
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principle of the Hearsay exception such state-
ments may (if admissible) be received against 
either party; but on the principle of Agency, 
against the employer only; moreover when 
offered against the employer, the limitations 
of the two principles would be in some respects 
more favorable, in others less favorable, to 
the reception of the evidence." 
See United American Fire Insurance Co. v. 
American Bonding Co., 146 Wis. 573, 131 N.W. 994, 
996 (1911): 
"We receive no good reason why, where 
an agent does an act which it is his duty under 
his contract to perform, evidence of that act 
after his principal duty as agent has ceased, 
should not be admissible as well as if made 
during the time he was actually performing 
his duties, and we think it would be the better 
rule to hold such testimony competent." 
See Hollander v. Smith & Smith, 10 N.J. Super 
82, 76 A. ·2d 697, 21 ALR 2d 902; also Fish Lake 
Resort Co. v. Ind. Com., 73 Utah 4'79, 2'75 P 580. 
See Johnson v. Bimini Hot Springs, 56 Cal. 
App. 2d 892, 133 P 2d 650 (Personal injuries from 
fall on shower room floor, declaration of resident 
assistant manager and assistant secretary of de-
fendant corporation admitted.) 
Peterson v. General Geophysical Co., 185 P 2d 
56 (Death from explosion; statement of employee 
that company would take care of everything ad-
mitted.) 
12 
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Thorton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 257 P 2d 238 
(Collision of Motor Vehicles; statement of agent 
driver made some 20 to 30 minutes after the acci-
dent relative to the cause of collision admitted.) 
Litman v. Peper, 214 Minn. 127, 7 N.W. 2d 334 
(Wrongful death resulting from collision of dece-
dent's car with truck of defendant association, and 
operated by its employee co-defendant; admissions 
of defendant, operator of truck, held to warrant sub-
mission of case to jury.) 
The facts and stipulations in the record clearly 
show deceased was in the course of his employment 
and was killed by an accident arising out of his 
employment. Appellant has failed to prove that there 
was any departure from his employment. 
The facts and circumstances surrounding de-
cedent's death are clear and uncontroverted. 
See 100 CJS par. 513, Workmen's Compensa-
tion: 
"* * * and where the cause of a fall or 
death which occurs in the course of employ-
ment is unexplained an inference or presump-
tion arises that the fall or death would not 
have occurred except for some condition, risk, 
or hazard of the en1ploymen t." 
See also Riley v. Oxford Pape1'' Co., 103 A 2d 
111, 14'9 Me. 418. 
See also Spring Canyon C. Co. v. Ind. Com., 58 
U. 608, 615, 616, 201 P 173: 
13 
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"Lest we be misunderstood, we desire to 
add here that by anything we have said we do 
not claim that we can dictate to the Commis-
sion what probative force or effect they shall 
give to any inference that may be legitimately 
deduced from the facts and circumstances, 
direct or circumstantial, that are made to 
appear in any case. Nor can we interfere 
with the weight they shall give to the evidence 
or to the credibility of the ·witnesses, but what 
we mean is that when there is purely a ques-
tion of law presented, and which is necessarily 
involved in the decision or the award, it be-
comes our duty to determine that question. 
Whether an inference may legitimately be de-
duced from a particular fact, or from a state 
of facts, or from circumstances, is purely a 
question of law; while the probative force or 
effect that shall be given to the inference, if, 
as a matter of law, it may legitimately be de-
duced from the given fact, or state of facts, 
or circumstances, is a question of fact. Wheth-
er the inference in question may be deduced 
as claimed is therefore a question of law which 
we must determine as such. 
"If, therefore, all the facts and circum-
stances in this case are considered, may it 
legitimately be inferred therefrom that the 
deceased was injured by an accident arising 
out of his employment? And may it be fur-
ther inferred that the act which caused his 
death was 'directed against him because of 
his employment?' It frequently happens that 
an employee is found dead at or near his 
place of work. Usually there are some facts 
and circumstances from which it may be in-
ferred that the death resulted from injuries 
inflicted by violence. There may also be and 
14 
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usually are, marks or bruises, or other indica-
tions, found upon the body of the deceased 
from which it may be inferred what caused 
them. If the deceased worked in a mine there 
may be evidence that a rock or other material 
fell upon him from the roof, or from some 
other part of the mine. Again, timbers, if there 
were such, may have given way and fallen 
upon him, or have otherwise injured him. If 
he was working in a factory at or near moving 
machinery or other objects there may be some 
fact or circumstances which indicates that 
he was injured by the moving machinery or 
the other objects referred to. The reader may 
readily supply many other instances where 
injury may have been inflicted which resulted 
in death, and where the eause of death must 
be inferred from the facts and circumstances 
as they are made to appear." 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Industrial Commission 
should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WAL'TER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for 
Industrial Commission 
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH 
Attorney for 
Lauretta M. Glad den 
JOHN BEASLIN 
Attorney for Louise Gladden 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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